Abstract: We show that incomplete cartels in quantity-setting oligopolies may increase welfare, without any efficiencies or synergies being internalized by cartel formation. The main intuition is that the cartel has an incentive to contract output and that the firms outside the cartel react to this by expanding output. If the outsiders are more efficient than the cartel firms, average production costs go down. We model collusion in a market structure with imperfect substitute goods. Even for relatively moderate differences in efficiency, total welfare may increase due to this market-induced rationalization, whereas the cartel remains profitable. We discuss why the effect can be relevant for sectors where new, superior products are developed. Because anti-cartel enforcement is costly, it is important for competition authorities to realize that not all cartels lead to a welfare loss.
Introduction
It is commonplace that collusion decreases social welfare. Price fixing agreements typically increase industry profits at the expense of consumer welfare and the resulting reduction in output creates deadweight losses. Still, over the years several examples of "efficient cartels" have been introduced in the literature. Collusion may, for example, be the appropriate response to the non-existence of competitive equilibrium, when there are large fixed costs or increasing returns to scale (Sjostrom 1989) . Kinghorn (1996) finds that when competitive production levels fluctuate abundantly, a cartel might stabilize the market and lead to the adoption of more efficient technologies. It has further been suggested that cartels may lead to an increase instead of a decrease in output, because firms invest in capacity to increase their share in the cartel (Matsui 1989) , or because the cartel acts as a Stackelberg leader in the presence of a competitive fringe (Daughety 1990; Montero and Guzman 2010) .
For mergers, there is much more evidence that efficiencies might be a real possibility. Important examples are the circumvention of fixed costs (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983) or synergies leading to marginal costs for the merged entity that are lower than marginal costs for any of its constituent firms (Farrell and Shapiro 1990; Cheung 1992) . A particular type of efficiency, requiring no technological advance, occurs when an efficient firm (that is, a firm producing against low marginal costs) merges with a less efficient firm. The merged entity can then shift production from the inefficient to the efficient plant, thereby reducing aggregate production costs. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) refer to this phenomenon as rationalizing production. However, for cartels without side payments it may be difficult to redistribute production -in particular to shut down plants -such that all firms benefit, while simultaneously increasing welfare. Bos and Pot (2012) explore this possibility.
While the literature indicates that efficient cartels might exist, competition authorities still treat collusion as unquestionably harmful to society. One reason for this might be that the theoretical results rely on particular deviations from standard models, for which only limited case studies have been provided. Although systematic studies of known cartels are necessarily difficult, these deviations further limit the applicability of the results. Taylor (2010) tests two efficient cartel hypotheses in a panel of industries under a nation-wide cartel programme in the US during the 1930s. He finds no evidence that cartel firms with large fixed costs are relatively less harmful than cartels without large fixed costs, although there is support that output variability somewhat reduces the welfare losses.
In this article, we identify a different and potentially more relevant mechanism through which collusion (or a horizontal merger) may increase welfare, which we refer to -following Stennek (2003) -as market-induced rationalization.
1 This occurs when firms that are less efficient than others collude and contract their output. The optimal response of the non-colluding, but cost-1 While we borrow this term from Stennek (2003) , we use it in a more common setting. The model of Stennek (2003) is special in the sense that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient, because the cost functions are assumed to be private knowledge.
efficient, firms, is to expand their production, provided they compete in quantities. Aggregate output as well as average production costs will then decrease. If the reduction in costs is large enough, social welfare may increase. Note that the cartel neither internalizes some particular efficiency nor increases output. The cartel in itself is not efficient: it is the response of the market to collusion that generates the welfare enhancement. We embed our mechanism of market-induced rationalization in a market structure with imperfect substitutes. While partial cartels within certain market segments are widely-spread in practice, the industrial organization literature on competition and imperfect product substitution is relatively scarce. One example is Kolstadt (1994) , who investigates the effects of a monopoly in coexisting exhaustible resource markets by use of a Hotelling spatial model. The assumption of imperfect substitutes is not necessary for market-induced rationalization, but is natural while considering partial cartels. Moreover, we will show that it makes cartel formation more often profitable and, therefore, more likely to occur in practice.
The phenomenon identified here may be relevant in sectors where new, superior products are developed next to existing ones. Think of natural resources that were historically easy to extract and for which high-quality alternatives have been found. This situation can typically be modeled by imperfect substitutability, like we do here. As stated by Kolstadt (1994) , "[the] direct connection between rents for resources that are not perfectly substitutable is usually overlooked" in the economic literature. As firms of the dominant energy sources risk losing market share to upcoming alternatives, they will be tempted to reboost profits by collusion.
The welfare effects of collusion running through producers of imperfect substitutes are up till now unexplored, but appear to be a fruitful area for empirical research. Montero and Guzman (2010) consider one of the international copper cartels that took place up to the 1980s, but ignore its main (imperfect) substitute, aluminum. Still, Panayatou (1978) has argued that aluminum plays an important role in cartels within the copper market. Another important example is formed by the energy sector with the traditional resources of coal, oil, and gas. It is remarkable that the formation of the RhenishWestphalian coal cartel at the beginning of the twentieth century (e.g. Bittner 2005) coincided with the first oil drillings, which led to an oil boom in Germany. Also the price control of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) should be assessed in connection with alternative renewable energy sources.
Using a stylized market structure with two products, we analyze a cartel of firms producing one of the products. We show that such an incomplete cartel may increase welfare through market-induced rationalization, a result that up till now has not been explicitly acknowledged in the literature.
2 In Section 2, we introduce the market structure, and conditions for the cartel to increase welfare are identified in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the policy implications of our result. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Market structure and incomplete cartels
Market demand originates from a representative consumer spending his income on commodities 1 and 2 according to the following linear inverse demand functions 3 :
with P i and Q i the price and consumption of commodity i, i ¼ 1; 2 and a; b > 0 demand parameters. The parameter # 2 0; 1 ð measures the degree of substitutability between commodities 1 and 2, with # ¼ 1 implying perfect substitutability. 4 Production takes place in industries 1 and 2, with n firms in industry 1 producing commodity 1 against constant marginal costs c ! 0, and m firms in industry 2 producing commodity 2 against marginal costs d ! 0. We assume c ! d and introduce
as a measure of the production efficiency difference between producers of the two commodities (note that the denominator a À c equals the maximum gains from trade from production of commodity 1).
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Firms compete with quantities as strategic variable (Cournot competition) in both industries. Market equilibrium can be characterized as follows.
Then, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by all firms in industry 1 producing q
and all firms in industry 2 producing q Ã 2 , where
Total production is given by Q
Note that for efficiency differences larger than Δ, firms in industry 1 are inactive in equilibrium.
We now analyze the effect of a cartel agreement between all firms in industry 1. The underlying premise is that, in practice, it is easier to arrive at a cartel arrangement within a group of firms having a similar production process and consumer demand. The objective of this incomplete cartel is to set the total quantity of commodity 1 such that aggregate profits of firms from industry 1 are maximized. Firms from industry 2 still compete in quantities.
5 Our analysis is centered around the assumption that industry 2 is cost-efficient (i.e. d cÞ, but it also applies to situations where products from industry 2 are qualitatively superior. In fact, this could be easily incorporated in the model by a reinterpretation of Δ. After generalizing the inverse demand functions to P i Q i ; Q j À Á ¼ a i À bQ i À b#Q j for i; j 2 f1; 2g and jÞi, assuming a 2 ! a 1 means that industry 2 produces higher quality goods than industry 1, as measured in a vertical sense; see Häckner (2000) . Solving the more general model leads us to redefine Δ ¼ ðcÀdÞþða2Àa1Þ a1Àc
, a combined measure of the differences in efficiency and quality. The expressions in Lemma 1, Proposition 2, Lemma 3, and Proposition 4 remain unchanged (note that in expression 2 the term (a À cÞ has to be replaced with ða 1 À cÞ). All our results can, therefore, be interpreted in terms of differences in quality as well as efficiency. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
Market-Induced Rationalization and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels
Proposition 2 A cartel of the n firms from industry 1 increases consumer prices and output of commodity 2. It decreases output of commodity 1 and consumer welfare. The cartel is profitable for its members if and only if
and is always beneficial to firms from industry 2.
The decrease in consumer welfare is consistent with the finding that mergers in Cournot competition with homogeneous goods increase consumer prices, if no technological efficiencies materialize (Farrell and Shapiro 1990) . Condition [3] also generalizes the well-known merger paradox (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983) which says that mergers (or incomplete cartels) in quantity competition are only profitable if enough firms join. In fact, for # ¼ 1, our condition [3] reduces to n > m þ 1 ð Þ 2 which is equivalent to eq.
[3′] from Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983, 191) . It implies that the cartel in industry 1 is profitable only if industry 1 contains at least four times as many -but typically even much morefirms as industry 2. The reason is that the non-colluding firms respond to the contraction of output by the cartel by expanding output themselves. This decreases the cartel's profit and may outweigh the benefits of the agreement. The scope for profitable incomplete cartels widens for increasing marginal costs (Perry and Porter 1985) , price competition (Deneckere and Davidson 1985) , nonlinear demand (Cheung 1992) , or spatial relocation (Posada and Straume 2004) . Limited substitutability also softens the merger paradox: the lower bound in three decreases with a decrease in #. In particular, for # < ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 À 1 2 ffiffi ffi 2 p q % 0:54, the cartel in industry 1 is profitable for all possible values of n and m.
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The fact that the cartel is less profitable for small values of n also has ramifications for cartel sustainability (see e.g. Ross 1992) . As long as condition [3] holds the cartel is sustainable if the discount factor is high enough, but this critical discount factor is non-monotonic in n.
7 This is due to cartel profits being 6 Note that the profitability of the cartel (relative to the competitive case) does not depend on marginal costs c or d. This is a consequence of assuming linear cost and inverse demand functions. However, the efficiency difference Δ does determine market shares of individual firms. Therefore, the minimal number of firms to join for profitability might represent an arbitrarily small market share. In particular, the market share of industry 1 firms,
nm ΔÀΔ ð Þ nþmþmΔ for # ¼ 1; which becomes arbitrary small for Δ close enough to Δ. 7 It is straightforward to show that, assuming firms use grim trigger strategies, the critical discount factor for a sustainable cartel in the infinitely repeated game is given by
This critical discount factor is increasing in m and #, non-monotonic in n and strictly below 1 as long as condition [3] holds.
low -giving strong incentives to deviate and therefore requiring a high discount factor -either when n is small and condition [3] only just holds or when n is large.
Welfare-enhancing incomplete cartels
The impact of the cartel on total welfare, which we define as the sum of consumer surplus and aggregate profits, is ambiguous: consumers are harmed, firms from industry 2 gain, and firms from industry 1 may gain or lose (see Proposition 2). Figure 1 illustrates, for the case of perfect substitutes (# ¼ 1), how these different effects can be balanced against each other.
Aggregate output and output of industry 2 in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium are given by Q Ã and Q Ã 2 , respectively. The decrease in aggregate output to Q K , due to the cartel contracting its output, is mitigated, because firms from industry 2 respond by expanding their output from Q Ã 2 to Q K 2 . The price increases from P Ã to P K , and consumers are worse off: the difference in consumer surplus equals À A þ B þ C ð Þ< 0. Aggregate profits of firms in industry 2 go up by m π
, and the cartel's change in total profits equals π
The change in total welfare is F À C þ E ð Þ. The last part, À C þ E ð Þ, is the standard loss in consumer surplus and industry profits which arises when aggregate output falls below its competitive level. The other, non-standard, part, 
gives cost savings that result from the redistribution of output to industry 2. If these savings are large enough, total welfare may increase.
The efficiency difference Δ should be sufficiently high for the cost reduction to outweigh the deadweight loss from the decrease in production. Moreover, also the ability of the cartel to reduce aggregate output and the strength of the output expansion response of industry 2 are important determinants of the scope for welfare increasing cartels.
The following result helps investigating the conditions under which welfareenhancing cartels exist.
Lemma 3 Let n
Ã be the number of firms in industry 1 for which total welfare is maximized. Then, there exist numbers Δ L and Δ H , with
Lemma 3 implies that, for Δ L < Δ < Δ H , welfare typically improves with a decrease in the number of firms in industry 1. This suggests that there exists a range of values of Δ (containing the interval ½Δ H ; Δ) for which a cartel of industry 1 firms increases total welfare. Proposition 4, which is our main result, specifies this interval.
Proposition 4 A cartel of the n firms in industry 1 increases total welfare if and only if
This lower bound satisfies Δ L < H n; m; # ð Þ< Δ H and decreases in n and #.
Note that the mechanism through which the cartel may improve welfare is closely related to the one responsible for the merger paradox: for the costefficient non-colluding firms, it is optimal to respond to output contraction of the cartel by expanding their output. This output expansion makes the cartel less profitable, and it decreases average production costs. The question, therefore, arises whether cartels exist that are simultaneously profitable and welfare enhancing. The shaded areas in Figure 2 provide examples of such market structures and suggest that they are a real possibility. The vertical lines correspond to condition [3] and the dashed curves correspond to condition [4] . Departing from perfect substitutability (by decreasing # below 1) increases the scope for profitable cartels substantially, but does not severely limit the possibility of an increase in total welfare. Figure 2 show that the scope for welfare-enhancing cartels increases with an increase in n or #. An increase in m can reduce the required efficiency differences (especially when commodities are close substitutes), but overall the shaded areas of profitable and welfare-enhancing cartels become smaller. The intuition for the effect of # is straightforward: if commodities are closer substitutes, industry 2 will expand output more in response to a cartel in industry 1. The effect of n and m are harder to interpret. An increase in n, for example, implies that the cartel will contract output more and consequently that industry 2 will expand output more. The net result of these two effects turns out to be always positive.
Proposition 4 and
In our main examples given by Figure 2 , the number of efficient firms m is quite low, both in an absolute sense and relative to n. One may wonder whether The scope for profitable and welfare-enhancing incomplete cartels in the (n, Δ)-space for different values of m and #. Efficiency differences between the upper horizontal line (Δ) and the lower curve (H) yield a competitive equilibrium with strictly positive production levels in which a cartel increases welfare. The vertical line represents the minimal number of firms n that is required for the cartel to be profitable as in eq. [3] Market-Induced Rationalization and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels the efficient firms cannot form a cartel themselves. This alternative cartel could be easier to sustain than the cartel of inefficient firms (as it consists of less colluding parties) and does affect its profitability and welfare consequences. We make two observations about this alternative cartel. First, note that a smaller number of efficient firms means that it may be more difficult for these firms to form and sustain a cartel than for inefficient firms, because the profitability of both cartels is symmetric and the merger paradox can apply to both industries. 8 Second, note that a monopoly in industry 2 (m ¼ 1) is formally equivalent to the situation after a cartel of efficient firms has been formed. Comparing the first column of Figure 2 with the other columns for higher m, therefore, indicates that the scope of profitable and welfare-enhancing cartels of inefficient firms increases with the existence of a cartel of efficient firms.
The required efficiency differences in Figure 2 range from rather low (Hð20; 3; 1Þ % 0:036) to quite high values (Hð2; 1; 0:54Þ % 0:85). The case of perfect substitutes combined with perfect competition in industry 1 gives lim n!1 Hðn; m; 1Þ ¼ 1=½mð2m þ 5Þ as a lower bound of the required efficiency difference. This lower bound becomes arbitrarily small for increasing m.
Discussion
In this article, we introduced a mechanism by which incomplete cartels may (unintentionally) increase social welfare in quantity-setting oligopolies. Noncolluding, but cost-efficient firms expand output in response to the output contraction of the colluding firms. The resulting decrease in average production costs may outweigh the deadweight loss from the decrease in aggregate production. These welfare-enhancing cartels exist for reasonable parameter values in a stylized market with linear inverse demands and constant marginal costs and do not require any synergies between the colluding firms or other special features. In a similar fashion, an incomplete cartel between producers of low-quality products may be welfare enhancing when it leads to an increase in the supply of high-quality products.
Conversely, a cartel between efficient producers reduces welfare beyond the deadweight loss from decreased output, since it additionally leads to a shift of production to the inefficient firms. Which of these two cartels is more likely to occur depends on many factors. In any case, because of the merger paradox, the number of colluding participants should be sufficiently high. As products get more differentiated, this restriction gets weaker.
Our analysis shows that the tendency of inefficient firms to collude might increase social welfare through market-induced rationalization. It suggests that competition authorities, in principle, might consider being lenient toward such cartels. However, consumers always face higher prices and are always worse off. In practice, competition authorities could, therefore, prefer to protect consumers, if they weigh consumer welfare higher than industry profits. Farrell and Katz (2006) provide a recent contribution in the debate concerning consumer surplus and total surplus as welfare standards for antitrust.
As our form of rationalizing production is market-induced, it depends on information about production costs, which is typically private. As in many practical cartel or merger cases, it might be difficult to obtain this information truthfully from market participants. However, exactly for the reason that anticartel enforcement is so costly, it is important for competition authorities to realize that not all cartels necessarily lead to welfare losses and that the benefits of enforcement may, therefore, be overestimated.
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Appendix Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Firm i in industry 1 sets its quantity q 1i in order to maximize P P kÞi q 1k þ q 1i ;
and firm j in industry 2 sets its quantity q 2j to maximize P 2 P kÞj q 2k þ q 2j ; The solution of which is given by q 1i ¼ q Ã 1 for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n and q 2j ¼ q Ã 2 for j ¼ 1; . . . ; m. Prices and profits follow straightforwardly from this.
Proof of Proposition 2. Although n is an integer, for mathematical convenience we may treat it as a continuous variable (as Daughety 1990: footnote 1). Differentiating q Ã 1 and q Ã 2 with respect to n we find that both are decreasing in the number of firms in industry 1:
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Then, the change in aggregate output is Since the consumer faces lower prices and consumes positive amounts of both commodities, he will be strictly better off with an increase in n.
Consequently, formation of a cartel in industry 1, which is formally equivalent with a decrease of the number of firms in that industry from n to 1, will increase both prices, decreases production of commodity 1 and increases production of commodity 2. Moreover, the consumer will be strictly worse off, and firms from industry 2, which now sell more and at a higher price, will be better off. The cartel is profitable, if π 1 ð1; mÞ ! nπ 1 ðn; mÞ, or when q 1 ð1; mÞ > ffiffiffi n p q 1 ðn; mÞ -that is, when the cartel does not restrain production by too much. This is the case for the values of n given by condition [3] . ■ Proof of Lemma 3. Denote by q 1 ðn; ΔÞ ¼ q Ã 1 and q 2 ðn; ΔÞ ¼ q Ã 2 the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities when there are n firms independently producing commodity 1 (where, for notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of q
